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IN THE SUPREME COURT
O,F THE STATE OF UTAH
H. OJ1~0RGE BHA\DBURY, Adminis-1'
trator of the EstatP of Georg(• R.
Bradbury, dPecasf'cl, and ALTHEA
1~1\.\DBURY,

Plaiuf'iffs aud Resprmdrnfs,

Case

-\·s.-

No. 10055

UOH!Hl~

L. RAS?\IUSSEN and
YOTL\ OENE RAS:\IPSRFJK,
his wife,
Defendants a11d Appellants.

)

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves an action by R. George Bradbury
as Administrator of his father's estate, George R. Bradbury, deceased, and Althea Bradbury, surviving widow
of George R. Bradbury, to cancel and annul a deed and
conveyance ()f certain real property and water rights (represented by shares of stock in the Joseph Irrigation Compan~?) from George R. Bradbury and Althea Bradbury
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to the Defendants, in which the Grantors reserved a life
estate to themselves and to the survivor of them, and to
cancel and annul a farm lease agreement executed between the parties, whereby Defendants leased the farm
and agreed to operate the same and pay to Grantors onehalf the proceeds derived therefrom during such life
estate.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried by the Court without a jury, although demand for jury was made and not waived; and
after rendering its Findings of Fact the Court determined as a sole conclusion of law that the Defendants
''in their confidential relationship, exerted undue influence upon the transferors'' thereby entitling Plaintiffs to a judgment declaring the deed and transfer of
water stock, together with the farm lease agreement, to
be null and void and rescinded.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The trial court's decision in favor of Plaintiffs, as
reported in its written decision, was based upon the erroneous determination that ''a close and confiential relationship" existed between Plaintiffs and Defendants so
that "the burden of proof is shifted so as to require"
the Defendants to sustain the validity of the transfer of
property and execution of the farm lease. (R. 33, 50)
As a result of placing the burden of proof upon the
Defendants to prove the fairness of the transaction, the

2
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court further erroneously concluded that "Defendants
in their confidential relationship, exerted undue influence
upon the Transferors.'' (R. 53)
This appeal is taken for the purpose of having this
court determine: ( 1) That no "confidential relationship"
Pxi~tt•d between the Bradburys and Defendants as that
term is considered in its legal significance so that Defendants did not have the burden of proving the fairness of
the transaction; (2) That Plaintiffs failed to show by
dear and convincing proof that the Defendants exerted
"undue influence" upon the Bradburys in connection
with the transaction; (3) That there was adequate consideration for the transfer of property and execution of
the lease; and ( 4) that the case in any event should have
been tried to a jury.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
George R. Bradbury, now deceased, and his wife Althea Bradbury (who has since remarried and is now Althea "'"ashburn, but whom we will for convenience refer
to as ~[rs. Bradbury) lived in Joseph, Utah, where they
o'vned, and in years past had operated, an irrigated farm
with some additional grazing land. There are two small
homes located side by side on a. small lot. (R. 265) R.
George Bradbury (one of the Plaintiffs, as Administrator of his father's estate) is the only child of l\Ir. and
Mrs. George R. Bradbury. The Defendant, Y ora, was
raised by the Bradburys as their daughter although she
in fact is a daughter of a niece who had also been raised
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by them. (R. 74) Yora lived in the Bradbury home until
she reached maturity and married and had been treated
as though she were a child of the Bradburys. (R. 265)
After she married and moved away she continued to visit
with the Bradburys and they in turn visited with her on
holidays or special events such as birthdays. Yora remembered her foster parents on such occasions as their
birthday or Christmas and showed the normal feelings,
love and attention to them that a natural child would
have done.
For several years prior to the year 1960, the farm
had been leased or rented to other individuals. (R. 101)
At least on two different occasions the son, R. George
Bradbury, had operated the farm (R. 269); but he had
finally left in 1957 or 1958, apparently telling his father
that he was going out and get a job and wouldn't have
the property as a gift. (R. 262) Before their son operated
it the last time, it had been leased to Leon Taylor for 3
or 4 years. (R. 101, 102) When R. George left the last
time, it was rented to M.D. (Dewey) Foreman, a brother of Mrs. Bradbury. (R. 102) He operated the farm
from 1957 through 1959 (R. 98, 433). Near the end of
the 1959 season he advised the Bradburys that he was not
going to operate the farm for them any longer and suggested they consider selling it, but they didn't want to.
Mr. Bradbury had ''acquired the property from hard
labor and he didn't feel like he wanted to let loose of it.''
(R. 433)
Insofar as the record discloses, the first time the matter of Defendants acquiring the property was mentioned
4
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wns in October 1959. :Mrs. Bradbury testified that when
the Rasmussens were down for the deer hunt ~Ir. Bradbury said they had been talking about selling the farm
nnd wanted $300.00 an acre for it, whereupon l\Ir. Rasmm;sen said he would think about it. (R. 75) Although
~lr. and Mrs. Bradbury's testimony differs substantially
t'rom :Mr. and l\[rs. Rasmussen's there is no dispute that
tlw matter of acquiring the farm and moving to Joseph,
Utah, was first discussed in the fall of 1959 and that one
or more discussions followed until all of the parties (~Ir.
and l\[ rs. Bradbury and Mr. and Mrs. Rasmussen) went
to see an attorney, Tex R. Olsen, in Richfield about Jannary 18, or February 1, 1960. (R. 76, 275) The court, in
its Amended Findings of Facts, found:
"9. That the said George R. Bradbury and
Althea Bradbury were interested in having the
Defendants move to Sevier County and live close
to the Bradburys where they could have the companionship and association with Defendants and
their children during their declining years ....
"11. That prior to the preparation or execution
of any documents in connection with the instant
matter the parties met with an attorney, Tex R.
Olsen, at Richfield, Utah, who counseled and ad,·ised the parties with respect to the proposed
transaction." (R. 51)
The testimony of the Bradburys differs in many
respects from the testimony of the Rasmussens as to what
took place in ~Ir. Olsen's office. However, as will be
pointed out hereinafter, ~Ir. Olsen corroborated Defendants· ,·ersion of what happened. Mrs. Bradbury testified that ~Ir. Olsen asked ~Ir. Bradbury about the
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farming ground and how much water there was. Mr.
Bradbury told him 76 acres and how many shares of
water he had. (R. 83)
Although Mrs. Bradbury also testified the papers were
signed that day in Mr. Olsen's office (R. 84) it appears
conclusively that they were not. Mr. Bradbury testified
in his deposition that they were in l\ir. Olsen's office 3
times. (R.159) The Bradburys and the Rasmussens drove
to Mr. Olsen's office in separate cars (R. 83). When they
left the office the Rasmussens went on back to Orem and
the Bradburys drove back to Joseph (R. 279). Later Mr.
and Mrs. Bradbury returned to Mr. Olsen's office with
some tax notices on their property which were more legible than the ones they had taken the :first day (R. 216,
217). Later the Bra.dburys returned to Mr. Olsen's office
a third time where the papers were read to them by Mr.
Olsen and were signed by them. (R. 130, 218) Both Mr.
and Mrs. Bradbury testified that Mr. Olsen read the documents over to them but they claimed they didn't understand them. (R. 130, 219) Mrs. Bradbury testified they received a copy of the contract but not the deed. (R. 120)
The papers signed by the Bradburys in Mr. Olsen's
office on February 18, 1960, consist of a warranty deed
conveying their real estate to the Rasmussens, reserving
a life estate to the grantors and the survivor of them
(Exh.1, R. 445, 446) and a Farm Lease Agreement whereby the Bradburys leased the same property to the Rasmussens for the term of the life of the survivor of Lessors "unless sooner terminated upon mutual agreement."
( Exh. 2, R. 447-449)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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The following day Mr. Olsen mailed the deed and
2 copies of the lease to the Rasmussens in Orem, Utah,
with the request that if the lease appeared to be satisfactory to sign both copies and return the original ( Exh.
9, R. 477). This they did. (R. 280) About March 1, 1960,
ns the Rasmussens were traveling through Joseph, Utah,
on a trip with some friends, they stopped and Mrs. Rasmussen gave Mrs. Bradbury a check for $1.00 as mentioned in the deed. (Exh. 7, R. 475) l\Irs. Rasmussen testified that Mr. Bradbury was present and that she stated
to the Bradburys she was giving them the check because
it was part of the deal. (R. 282)
Shortly thereafter Mr. Rasmussen moved down to
Joseph and took over the farm. He lived with the Bradburys until his family moved down after school let out in
the spring. Shortly after he arrived on tlie farm Mrs.
Bradbury wrote to Mrs. Rasmussen telling what Gordon
was doing. (Exh. 6, R. 474) The Ra.smussens both gave
up jobs and sold their home in Orem to move down on
the farm and operate it and live near the Bradburys as
agreed. (R. 282, 283)
Later the Bradburys gave Gordon the three certificates of water stock which were taken to the secretary
of the Company, along with separate assignments executed by the Bradburys, and a new certificate was issued
to the Rasmussens. The certificate was returned to the
Bradburys and held by them. (Exhs. 10, 11, 12, 14, R. 479,
90, 91, 221, 364-368)
Everything apparently went smoothly for some time
(R. 284, 437). Gordon Rasmussen worked hard on the
7
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farm; and Mr. Bradbury helped him financially to buy
cattle. (R. 369) Mr. Bradbury testified that the operation
had been as ·good as it could be. (R. 229) However, after
1frs. Bradbury made a trip to Salt Lake City with their
son George in the spring of 1961, she came home and told
the Rasmussens that things would have to be changed because the son would not stand for the deal. This is according to the testimony of the Rasmussens. (R. 192, 285).
Mrs. Bradbury testified the break came when a man from
a bank came to the place in August, 1961, to check on the
property at which time she and Mr. Bradbury looked the
papers over and saw what had happened. (R. 88)
However, her own brother, M.D. Foreman testified that
in the spring of 1961 ''all at once the devil jumped up
and they were at each other's throats." (R. 437) In July,
1961, he drove the Bradburys to St. George to see their
son and as he picked them up to bring them back their
son told them to fight it all the way to get the property
back. ( R. 439)
The Bradburys contacted Mr. John Vernieu, an attorney, of Richfield, who filed suit to rescind the deed
and water certificate but not the lease, and asked for an
accounting of the amount due under the lease. (R. 1-11)
Later, an amendment was filed (R. 12-13) and a jury trial
demanded. (R. 16) Following the taking of the depositions of Mr. and Mrs. Bradbury by Defendants, ::\[r. Vernieu withdrew. (R. 17) After Mr. Bradbury passed away,
other counsel was obtained and a new amended complaint
was filed seeking to cancel and rescind not only the deed
and water stock but also the lease agreement. (R. 22-24)

8
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During the pendency of the action, the RasmussPHH continued to live next to the Bradburys, operated
the farm, and gave assistance and help to the Bradburys
as opportunity arose. (R. 363)
Then' are many additional items of fact not related
above- some of which are in dispute- but further reference thereto will be made in subsequent portions of this
brief. At the time of the occurrence of the events leading
up to and the signing of the documents in question l\fr.
Bradbury was over 83 years of age and under the findings
of the court "with ailing eyesight and disabilities incidt'nt to age." l\Irs. Bradbury was 73 years of age. (R. 50)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING A
"CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP" EXISTED BETWEEN THE BRADBURYS AND DEFENDANTSANDTHATDEFENDANTSHAD
THE BURDEN OF PROVING THE FAIRNESS
OF THE TRANSACTION.
One of the major arguments of counsel for Plaintiffs
during the trial was that there was a ''confidential relationship'' between the Bradburys and the Rasmussens
which placed the burden on Defendants to prove the fairness of the transaction between the parties. The trial
court determined that a confidential relationship did exist
which cast the burden on the Defendants ''to establish
the perf(_lrt fairness, adequacy of consideration, and
9

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

equity of the transaction." (R. 33) IIowever, the only
evidence to sustain this determination was the fact that
the Bradburys treated Yora Rasmussen as their daughter and she loved and respected them as her parents.
This Court has heretofore held that the relationship of
parent and child is not sufficient to create a "confidential
relationship'' requiring proof of fairness of the transaction. In the case of Halch v. Hatch, 46 U. 218, 148 P. 433,
where decedent had made a conveyance to his son at the
instigation of the Mother, the court held, after discussing many cases on the subject:
"In nearly all, if not all, of the foregoing cases
(excepting those cited from Utah) the question of
what constitutes a fiduciary relation or one of
such trust and confidence as ordinarily will cast
the burden of proof on the beneficiary of a particular transaction is fully discussed. It is made
very clear that under circumstances like those in
the case at bar there is no such fiduciary relation
of trust and confidence as will cast the burden of
proof upon the beneficiary under a deed or a. will.
The relation of parent and child or husband and
wife does n.ot, in and of itself, create any such presumption.'' (Emphasis added)
This same doctrine was again pronounced in the case
of Froyd v. Barn.hurst, 83 U. 271, 28 P. 2d 135. We quote:
"Appellants apparently place the burden of
their argument upon the proposition that there
was a confidential relationship existing between
defendant and her mother, Mrs. Sandin, and therefore this case is controlled by the rule that, where
such confidential relationship exists between grantor and grantee, the burden is upon the grantee

10

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to show the transaction to be fair and free from
fraud and undue influence. Appellant cites Peterson v. Bu-dge, 35 Utah 596, 102 P. 211; Birdsall v.
Leavitt, 32 Utah 136, 89 P. 397; TolOJnd v. Corey,
6 Utah 392, 24 P. 190; Omega Investment Co. v.
Jroolley, 72 Utah 474, 271 P. 797; also Paddock v.
Pulsifer_, 43 Kan. 718, 23 P. 1049, 1051.
"Defendants do not complain of the rule stated
and followed in these cases, but contend they have
no application to the case at bar. In other words,
they contend the facts here do not present a case
of fiduciary or confidential relationship. Here the
claim of fiduciary relationship is based upon the
following evidence in addition to the fact of the
parties being mother and daughter: The mother
was old and feeble, could not read or write the
English language; she lived with the daughter,
who at one time tried to collect a note belonging
to her mother without success. For a time they
had the mother's money in a joint bank account
in the name of both the mother and daughter,
and the daughter at times collected the rent due to
her mother.
"This court is committed to the doctrine that
the mere relationship of parent and child does not
ronstitute evidence of such confidential relationship as to create a presumption of fraud or undue
influence. Hatch v. Hatch, 46 Utah 218, 148 P.
433, 437; Furlong v. Tilley, 51 Utah 617, 172
P. 676.''
The evidence in the instant case is even weaker on
the matter of confidential relationship than in the two
cases above cited. The Rasmussens did not live with the
Bradburys but only visited as children should with parents on speria1 occasions. They had never had any busi11
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ness transactions. Gordon Rasmussen had never operated the farm or engaged in any family business matters.
Mr. Bradbury had always handled his own affairs. Although his son had prepared lease agreements for him
(R. 98) there is no testimony that Gordon Rasmussen had
ever discussed the operation of the farm prior to October,
1959.
In the Hatch case, supra, the court quotes with approval from the opinion of the Iowa Supreme Court in
Chidester v. Turnbull, 117 Ia. 168, 90 N.W. 583, a particularly applicable statement, as follows:
''Counsel for plaintiffs contend that the burden
is on the defendant, Thomas Turnbull, to prove
that the conveyance to him by his father was not
procured by means of undue influence of or imposition for which the relations of the parties gave
opportunity, but this is not true. We have recently
held that the fact that a voluntary conveyance is
made from father to son while the father is residing in the son's family, even though the conveyance deprives other children of their proportionate share in the father's property, is not presumptively fraudulent, and will not throw on the
grantee the burden of proving the want of undue
influence. The owner of property has a right to
dispose of it during his lifetime as he sees fit,
even though his act may, in itself, seem to be
unfair and unreasonable with reference to the
interest of other children than the one to whom
the conveyance is made.''
See, also, Fu.rlong v. Tilley, 51 U. 617, 172 P. 676.
In its written decision in the instant case, the trial
court relied upon the decision in the case of Petersen "·
12
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Bud.rJ(', :~;) U. 596, 102 P. ~11. However, the facts in that
case are in no way similar to those in the instant matter.
'fhe relationship of physician and patient existed there,
which the court held was sufficient in and of itself to
('reate a ''fiduciary or confidential relationship.'' But
as wp have seen from the authorities cited above such is
not the case between parent and child. Furthermore, the
l \mrt in the Budge case, went on to point out:
"We think the great preponderance of the eviclearly establishes the following propositions: (1) That the plaintiff, at the time of the
conveyancp in question, was, and for about 10
days prior thereto had been, sick and nervous and
greatly distressed in mind. (2) That, while in
such mental condition, he was induced and led to
believe by improper and undue influence that the
bank was about to foreclose its mortgages and
compel him to make a sacrifice of his mortgaged
property. (3) That the confidential relationship
of physician and patient existed between the
Budges and Peterson at the time the deed in question was made and executed. ( 4) That if the
Budges were not active participants in leading
and inducing Peterson, in his highly nervous and
demilitated condition, and while under great mental strain, to believe that the bank was about to
foreclose its mortgages and compel him to sacrifice his mortgaged property - representations
untrue in fact - they voluntarily accepted the
conveyance, well knowing such representations to
have been made, and such inducements brought to
bear upon him. ( 5) That Peterson, because of his
ph~·sical weakness and the nervous and unsettled
state of his mind at the time the deed was made
and executed, was in no condition to transact businPss requiring much exertion or mental strain. (6)
dPlteP

13
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That the consideration paid by the Budges was
wholly inadequate. (7) That the defendants have
failed to sustain the burden of proof cast upon
them by law to show that the transaction on their
part was in every respect open, fair and equitable.
Therefore, even if it were conceded that the
Budges made no promises whatever to reconvey
the property to Peterson, he still would be entitled to recover in this action."
In the case of Amado v. Aguirre, 63 Ariz. 213, 161
P. 2d 117, the Arizona Supreme Court stated the rule as
follows:
''A deed or gift from a parent to a child, or from
one who, in fact, stands in the relationship of a
parent to a donee, does not require absence of
fraud and undue influence to sustain it. Under
such circumstances, the relationship of parent and
child is not a fiduciary relationship within the
meaning of the rule applying to gifts or other
transactions with a fiduciary. Bishop v. Hilliard,
227 Ill. 382, 81 N.E. 403; White v. Smith, 338 Ill.
23, 169 N.E. 817; Lee v. Lee, 258 Mo. 599, 167 S.W.
1030; Sullivan v. Clear, 101 Conn. 603, 127 R. 14;
Couchman's Adm 'r v. Couchman, 98 Ky. 109, 32
S.W. 283. This is also the effect of the decision
of this court in Pass v. Stephens, supra.''
The Court then went on to hold:
''Moreover, to constitute such a confidential or
fiduciary relation in cases of gifts from parent to
child, brother and sister, aunt or uncle, and niece
or nephew, which would authorize a presumption
of undue influence and change the burden of
proof, there must be proof of circumstances indicating actual dominance of the donee over the
donor. 68 C. J. 762, sec. 451, Wills; Wessell v.
14
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Rathjohn, 89 N.C. :r77, 43 Am. Rep., 696; Cook v.
IIilggins, ~90 Mo. 402, 235 S.W. 807; Lee v. Lee,
Rnpra; Turner v. Gumbert, 19 Idaho 339, 114
P. 3:1; Stanfield v. Hennegar, 259 Mo. 41, 167 S.,V.
lO:H>; ~!allow v. Walker, 115 Iowa 238, 88 N.W.
-t.>~. 91 Am. St. Rep. 158; Slayback v. 'Yitt, 151
Ind. 376, 50 N.E. 389; Rowe v. Freeman, 89 Or.
428, 172 P. 508, 17 4 P. 727; Sawyer v. White, 8
Cir., 122 F. 223."
In the case of Salvner v. Salcner, 349 :Mich. 37:J, 84
N.,V. ~d 871, the Supreme Court of l\iichigan made some
ohRrrvations partienlarly pertinent to the facts in the
instant ca~<-'. 'Ve quote:
''. \ gift from a parent to a child, particularly
under the circumstances disclosed by the case at
bar, raises no inference or presumption of undue
influence. Rather, the burden rests in one asserti~ invalidity to establish it by satisfactory proof.
39 Am. J ur. 744.
"On behalf of appellant it is contended that a
fiduciary relation existed as between him and the
defendants. The proofs do not support the claim.
The daughter Thusnelda, and likewise the son,
unquestionably did many things to assist their father, a perfectly natural course of conduct in view
of his physical condition. However, the record
falls far short of establishing that plaintiff was
governed by their advice or that he depended on
them in the making of decisions concerning his
business affairs, or otherwise. It clearly appears
that plaintiff, notwithstanding his physical condition, was able to determine for himself what
he wished to do and to refuse to act against his
o·wn inclinations. What defendants did to assist
him amounted to no more than would be prompted
normally by the existing relationship.''
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POINT II
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO
ESTABLISH THAT DEFENDANTS "EXERTED UNDUE INFLUENCE" UPON THE
BRADBURYS.
Although the fact alone that the trial court erroneously determined that a "confidential relationship"
existed between the Bradburys and Defendants would require a new trial, Appellants urge that the evidence is
insufficient in any respect to sustain the conclusion of
law that they exerted undue influence upon the Bradburys. In order to make a determination of this issue
the Court will be required to review the evidence. In this
connection the language of the Court in Corey v. Roberts,
82 U. 445, 25 P. 2d 940, is particularly applicable. We
quote:
"In equity cases the appeal (Const. Ut~, art. 8,
sec. 9) may be on questions of both law and fact.
Such is the appeal in this case. On such review
the duty of this court requires an examination of
all questions of law and all facts revealed by the
record, and, after making such examination and
due allowance for the better opportunity afforded
the trial court to observe the demeanor of witnesses, and more advantageous position of determining their credibility and the weight to be
given to the testimony submitted, this court, analogous to a trial de novo on the record, will determine from a fair preponderance or greater
weight of the evidence whether or not the findings of the trial court are supported thereb~'· Lawley v. Hickenlooper, 61 Utah, 298, 21~ P. 526."
In reviewing the evidence in the case we believe this
court will be impressed with the testimony of the inde16
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pendent witnesses and we therefore briefly summa nze
what tlwy had to say .
.. Jttorncy TEx R. OLSEN testified that he had done no
legal work for the parties prior to February, 1960, at
whi('h time Gordon Rasmussen came to his office and
mnde an appointment for himself and his wife and ~Ir.
and :\lrs. Bradbury. (R. 234) It was an appointment set
up for a Hundny because the Rasmussens could only be
down tlwrc on a weekend. (R. 234, 235) When the parties
rame to his office he was told that the Rasmussens were
thinking of moving down from Orem to Sevier County,
leaving their job, to take care of the farm and that they
wanted to work out some arrangement so the farm
wouldn't go to anyone else after the death of the Bradhnrys. There was a discussion as to how to work this
out so that the Rasmussens could take care of the propPrty and of the Bradburys during their declining years.
~r rs. Bradbury said in this conversation that she wanted
to gin:- these kids some security if they came down to
the property. It was discussed that the use of a will could
be changed and that therefore this would be no security
because their son, R. G. Bradbury, could come in in the
event there was a change. Mr. Olsen then suggested the
giving of a deed, reserving a life estate to the Bradburys.
The ''Bradburys thought this would be agreeable with
them because they wanted the property to go to the Rasmussens and they wanted some assurance that they would
get somethi11g- out of it during their lifetime." (R. 236)
They then discussed how the property would be operated
during the lifetime of the Bradburys and it was decided
to execute a lease to the Hasmussens by which the net
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profits derived from the farm would be divided fifty-fifty.
(R. 237) In talking about the deed Mr. Olsen pointed out
to all four that it would be "an absolute conveyance and
if they had a life estate, they wouldn't have any security they could mortgage or anything else." (R. 237) The
attorney even suggested leaving out the pasture ground
and give the Rasmussens an option to buy it so the Bradburys "would have some security they could use." However, Mr. Bradbury said, "It's an operating unit." "It
all goes together." (R. 238) The description of the
property was discussed, and the Bradburys produced
some tax assessment notices. These were blotched and
could not be read so Mrs. Bradbury agreed to bring down
some additional notices. (R. 238) The conference lasted
about an hour and a half to two hours. (R. 239) They
discussed getting together again but ::\Ir. Rasmussen said
he and his wife had to get back to Orem and wondered
if they needed to be there any more. Mr. Olsen agreed
to mail them the papers after they were prepared and
signed by the Bradburys. (R. 239) About two days later
Mrs. Bradbury came back to Mr. Olsen's office and
brought several tax notices on which were contained the
legal descriptions. At that time she asked :Mr. Olsen if
Yora was an heir and Mr. Olsen told her "No." Mrs.
Bradbury then remarked that the other property they
might have in their name would go to their son. (R. 240)
Mr. Olsen agreed to call the Bradburys when the papers
were ready.
On February 17th or 18th, 1960, l\Ir. and ~Irs. Bradbury came to his office after the papers had been pre-
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pared for signing..Mr. Olsen testified that he went over
the arrangements, the warranty deed with the reservation
of a life estate and also went over the lease with them,
nnd they told him "that's what they had in mind." (R.
:!41 ) The deed was signed and notarized and the lease
was sign<'d. At that time Mr. Olsen gave Mr. and ~frs.
Bra<lbury a carbon copy of the deed and also a carbon
C'opy of the lease. (R. 241) He stated that he had obsPt'Ved that both Mr. and Mrs. Bradbury were alert, able
to discusH these things; that Mr. Bradbury had quite a
sense of humor; and even joked about the arrangement
which he felt would require him to contribute financially
to help the Rasmussens get started; (R. 242) that Mr.
Bradbury was having some difficulty getting around because of his age, but otherwise appeared to be quite alert.
(R. ~42) At the time of the signing of the documents
there was just Mr. and Mrs. Bradbury present in addition
to the attorney. (R. 243) He thereafter mailed the documents to the Rasmussens. He prepared the assignments
that were attached to the water certificates, but they
were not signed in his presence. (R. 246)
On cross-examination Mr. Olsen said that the reason that the Rasmussens talked to him about having this
fixed up is that they wanted to be protected if they came
down on the property and that if the parents died they
did not want to haYe R. G. "booting" them off the property. (R. 248, 249)
OTTO KESLER, who resides at Cove Fort across the
mountain from Joseph, testified that he had been
19
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acquainted with George Bradbury during his life time.
He said he had known him for better than 50 years and
he also knew his wife. He recalled a conversation with
Mr. and Mrs. Bradbury in June of 1960 or 61 when some
cattle had gotten away from them and he saw ?\Ir. and
Mrs. Bradbury together with Gordon Rasmussen. This
was the first time he had ever met Gordon Rasmussen.
(R. 231) Mr. and Mrs. Bradbury told this witness that the
Rasmussens were going to take care of them and they were
turning the property over to him to take care of them
during their old age; that their son R. G. had gotten discouraged and left the farm and he had given no help to
them on the farm. (R. 232) On cross-examination he testified that Mr. Bradbury said, "I was letting them have
it for taking care of me. I am letting them have it for
taking care of us in our old age." (R. 232, 233)
JosEPH 0. NELSON, who lives in Richfield, testified
that he knew all of the parties. (R. 251, 252) He worked
for the Texas Oil Company and delivered gasoline to the
farmers in the area which sometimes required credit to
them. He had extended credit to George Bradbury and
to his son R. G. (R. 252) When Gordon Rasmussen took
over the operation of the farm and wanted credit, the witness discussed with Mr. Bradbury the company policy of
not extending credit unless the owner of the property
signed with the operator to guarantee payment for the
oil products. He explained fully to Mr. Bradbury ·what
the signature involved, read it over to him and ::\[r. Bradbury seemed to understand it, was able to hear him and
discussed it with him. (R. 253-255) ::\Ir. Nelson further
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testified about a conversation that he had with George
Hradbury hefore the signing of this guarantee in which
~[r. Bradbury said that his son George couldn't run the
place and that he couldn't continue to run the place; that
Gordon Rasmussen was to have the property after l\Ir.
and ~[rs. Bradbury had passed away. He also said that
they were to have the property if they took care of the
expenses of ~Ir. and ~Irs. Bradbury. (R. 257)
?\In. KEITH OGDEN, who lived in Marysvale and had
been acquainted with the Bradburys fo_r approximately
20 years and had business dealings with them, (R. 259)
testified that in November, 1959, he and his wife had a
conversation with Mr. Bradbury whom they had taken
for a ride with them over to Scipio, Utah. (R. 259) In
this conversation l\Ir. Bradbury said that he knew that

his son could not run the property and he also knew that
Gordon Rasmussen had a. good job and that Yora worked
and they had a good home in Orem; that he would have
to make them a good deal if they were going to come down
and help him out. ''He said, 'I've leased it out for a
couple of years and that wasn't much good,' so he told us
that he told them that if they would take care of us the
rest of our time, they could have it." (R. 261, 262) He
said that his son R. G. had received two or three propo~itions and that he had tried to make it interesting for
him, but R. G. said he wouldn't have it as a gift, that
he was going out and get a. job. (R. 262) He further testified that nothing was said about selling the property to
the Rasmussens. (R. 263, 264)
21
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Defendants even required the attendance by subpoena of the brother of Mrs. Bradbury who had leased the
farm for approximately three years before the Rasmussens came down. Although he was understandably
reluctant to testify, MR. M. D. FoRMAN testified that he
had advised Mr. and Mrs. Bradbury to sell the property
but they didn't seem to want to; that he drove them up
to Orem to talk to Mr. and l\1rs. Rasmussen about the
property. (R. 443) He had a conversation with the Bradburys about the Rasmussens coming down on the property and the Bradburys told him that the Rasmussens
were coming down to take over the property and that
they (the Bradburys) were to get one-half of the proceeds from the farm. (R. 434, 435) He said that in this
same conversation the Bradburys told him the property
was to revert to Gordon and Yora when they (Mr. and
:Mrs. Bradbury) were deceased. (R. 436) He further testified that he observed the relationship between the parties ·when they first moved down in the year of 1960 and
they got along very well. But in the spring of 1961 that
''all at once the devil jumped up and they were at each
other's throats so I don't know what took place;" (R.
437) that on July 27, he took Mr. and 1\frs. Bradbury
down to St. George to see R. G. Bradbury and that as
he was picking them up to bring them back, he heard their
son say to them, "Well, we just as well fight it all the
way." (R. 439)
The only persons produced by the plaintiffs who
could be considered to be independent and have no interest in the outcome of the litigation were JUNIOR E. D1xox
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and V. V. JENSON. MR. DixoN, a locker plant operator,
testitll'd tha.t after Gordon Rasmussen came back, the
Bradburys told the witness they ''were making arrangemE.lnts so that they could buy the farm." (R. 181) However, he couldn't remember in what year this conversation occurred (R. 187) and it was just a passing remark.
(R. 182)
:\[R. JENSON testified he was in the dry cleaning business and knew Mr. Bradbury in his lifetime. (R. 403,
404) He talked to Mr. Bradbury once about his farm
and was told that Gordon was going to buy it from him.
(R. 405) This occurred in March or April after Gordon
had taken over the farm.

This testimony while having some probative value
as to whether 1\ir. Bradbury considered what had been
done as being a sale, has no effect or weight on the real
issue of whether Defendants had exerted undue influence
upon the Bra.dburys. For such consideration we turn
briefly to the testimony of the Bradburys themselves.
This testimony was very contradictory in many respects,
not only as between :Mr. and ~Irs. Bradbury but in the
course of relating the facts by the same witness 1\irs.
Bradbury testified the papers were prepared and signed
the first time they went to ~Ir. Olsen's office and in the
presence of the Rasmussens. (R. 83, 84) :Jir. Bradbury
testified that they were there three times. (R. 213, 214)
Mrs. Bradbury testified she discussed "rith Tex Olsen the
effect of giving the property to Yora and her husbandwhether Yora would still get something from the estate,
23
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(R. 119) but she testified she couldn't understand when
Mr. Olsen read the documents to them before the~· were
signed. (R. 84) She testified she thought they ·were signing a contract for the sale of the farm. (R. 85) But she
went on to testify that the only compensation or money
that the Rasmussens were going to pay was one-half of
the proceeds of what came off the farm (R. 135, 145)
and that the only written agreement she thought tl1ey
had was for the lease. (R. 146)
Although plaintiffs asserted (and the court found)
that Mr. Bradbury had ailing eyesight and other disabilities incident to age, there is no claim that either ::\Ir. or
~Irs. Bradbury was mentally infirm. In fact, Mrs. Bradbury was very active physically, drove the car, wrote out
the checks and othenYise participated in the business affairs of her husband. Despite his age, Mr. Bradbury was
intelligent and alert and worked around the farm \Yith
Gordon Rasmussen, bought seed grain (R. 223), paid the
taxes ( R. 224) recommended buying cattle and assisted
in doing so (R. 227, 228) and consulted with Gordon
about how the farm should be operated. (R. 228)
Since lVIr. Bradbury had passed a-way after the action was filed, his deposition was read as his testimony.
Several changes had been made in it ·which the court
allowed to be read although there was no evidence as to
how the changes had been made, who made them, or the
reason therefor. If l\Ir. Bradbury was alert enough to
make changes in his testimony from having his deposition read to him, he was alert enough to understand a
24

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

dPt>tl and a lease when they were read to him - particularl v since he had had previous experience of leasing the
premises. In summary, he testified that the first time
ht> knl'W the Rasmussens \Vere going to come down and
operate the farm was at Christmas time (R. 211) He
said that he would sell them the farm for $300.00 per
lH'l'l' but there was nothing said about how much down
or when they were to pa.y for it. (R. 212) There was no
spPei fit>(l amount per year to be paid but they were to pay
oHt>-half of what was made from the farm after expenses
werP taken out. ( R. 213) There was never any discussion
about paying anything more than one-half of what they
g-rew on the farm after expenses and the Rasmussens
were not to pay after he died. ( R. 213) He testified that
he met with Tex Olsen in Tex Olsen's office three times
and that they talked about this matter when Gordon and
his wife were there and that Tex was going to fix up a
lt>a~e to run the farm. (This was later changed on his
deposition to read that he was going to fix a contract
to purchase the farm.) (R. 214) Gordon did not say
anything about going to buy the farm while they were in
~Ir. Olson's office. (R. 214) The agreement vvas that the
llefendants were to pay one-half of what they grew on
the property after expenses were paid. (R. 216) He and
his wife had taken some tax notices down to Tex Olsen's
office because on the ones that they brought with them at
first the descriptions were blotted so badly Mr. Olsen
could not read them. (R. 216) He admitted signing Exhibits 1 & ~ (the warranty deed and lease). (R. 218)
These documents were read to him before they were
siglWll and he understood that the Rasmussens were
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going to pay one-half of the crops after they had pai<
expenses. (R. 2193 He claimed he never signed the as
siguments of the water certificates and that he had bee1
over to the irrigation company to check to see if the~
bore his signature and that they did not. (R. 220) He rec·
ognized that the certificates brought back by Yora wPn
not the same ones that he had given out, but he neve~
questioned ·why and had his wife put them in the box witlJ
the other papers. (R. 221) It was a year after these certificates were brought in by Y ora that l\Ir. Bradhnry
questioned them and asked his wife to get them out
again. They then talked to the Rasmussens about what
had happened. (R. 222)
We submit that this does not support an:T finding
or determination that he did not know what he was doing
or that undue influence ''Tas exerted upon him.
This court has had the opportunity on numerous occasions to consider whether a transfer of property should
be set aside on the ground of undue influence. In the very
early case of Chadd v. IIi oser, 25 U. 369, 71 P. 870, this
court reversed the trial court in setting aside a conveyance on the ground of undue influence and mental capacity. In doing so, this Court said:
"The record shows conclusively that, at the time
the deed was made, plaintiff was in possession
and in full control of her mental faculties. She
knew and understood what he was doing, and was
in every respect competent to act for herself. She
had the advice and assistance of a competent and
reliable attorney, who took pains to explain to
her what the legal effect of the act of deeding away
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lwr property would be. In fact, there is no evidenre whatever to the contrary, except the sweeping statement of plaintiff, made at the trial, that
she was "erazy" and did not know what she was
doing-. The only evidence introduced that tends
to st~pport the contention of want of capaci~y ~n
the part of plaintiff is that she was aged, 1n Ill
health, and very much enfeebled. But want of
capacity to contract will not be presumed because
of old age or physical infirmities. (Citing cases)

'·It appears from the record that the plaintiff,
about a year before the deed was made, spoke to
the defendants about deeding the property to
them, and subsequently, on several occasions,
again mentioned the matter; but there is not a
scintilla of evidence that either of the defendants
e\'er mentioned the matter to her until the day on
which the deed was executed. After they arrived
at the office of the attorney who prepared the deed,
there was some discussion as to whether the plaintiff should dispose of the property by will or by
deed. Plaintiff was in favor of making a will, but
the defendants refused to advance any more
money to protect the property and improve it and
help the plaintiff unless the conveyance was by
deed, which they had a perfect right to do. No
matter what moral obligations they were under
to take care of plaintiff and protect her property,
it must be conceded that they were under no legal
o~~igation to do so. The plaintiff finally, in oppo~thon to the advice of her attorney, decided to
make a deed, which was done. Defendant Mrs.
~loser, with the exception of about five years, had
lived all her life with her mother, and had raised
a large family under the same roof, and had recently cared for and nursed her through a severe
spell of siekness. Defendants had for several
years given plaintiff money to pay the taxes as-
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sessed against the property. The property ha<
been sold for assessments made for the extensior
of water mains, and more taxes, amounting tf
$31.50, would soon be due, which plaintiff was unable to pay. In addition to the care, attention, and
assistance thus extended, the defendants, by the
provisions of the lease, were obligated to continue to assist and provide for plaintiff during
the rest of her life. Under these circumstances,
coercion and undue influence will not be inf<>rred.
While courts of equity will carefully scrutinize
transactions of this character, when entered into
between parent and child, yet when, as in this
case, as shown by the record, no undue influencC'
has been used, such contracts will not be disturbed,
provided the complaining party at the time of
the transaction had legal and mental capacity to
contract.''
Again, in Stringfellow Y. Hanson, 25 U. 480, 71 P.
1052, this Court reversed a decision of the lower court
which had set aside a deed from father to daughter on
the grounds of undue influence, inadequate consideration and incompetence of the grantor. The grantor, as
here, was the party who initiated the action to have the
conveyance set aside. The court discussed each of the
grounds for annuling the deed relied on by the low(·r
court, as follows :
''We think the record wholly fails to show that
defendant exercised any undue influence over
the plaintiff at the time of, or prior to, the execution of the deed to the five acres. There is some
evidence in the record that she (the defendant)
had stated to some of her neighbors that she had
received a revelation from her mother, and that
it \\·as her mother's wish that plaintiff deed the
28
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lnnd in question to her, and that she had communicah•d thesP alleged spiritual manifestations to
her father. Plaintiff's deposition was taken in
his own behalf, and read in evidence. He testified
that, hrfore the deed was made, Emma had spoken
to him two or thrN• timPs about having a revelation
from her mother, but he does not state that he was
influenced or induced to make the deed because
of the alleged revelation. On the contrary, he
repeah•dly reiterated that he deeded the land to
hrr hecause it was the wish of his wife, before
her dt>ath, that Emma should have it, and because
she had been kind to them, and had taken care
of her mother during the latter's sickness. We do
not think the finding that defendant used or exereisPd undue influence over plaintiff at the time
the deed to the five acres was executed is supported hy thr evidence. It is a well-established rule of
law that when a parent, who is legally competent
to contract, makes a gift to his child in consideration of love and affection, it will be upheld. The
conduct of Emma Hanson toward her aged part•nts was such as would naturally tend to inspire
their love and gratitude, as it was clearly shown
that she, for two years, with but little, if any, aid
from any of her brothers or sisters, or other relations, constantly cared for and waited upon her
invalid and helpless mother, and after her mothn's death continued to care for, comfort and ad..
'
munster to the wants of her old father in his bereaYement. .A.nd the record affirmatively shows
that in pursuance of the high and commendable
dt'\·otion thus shown, and services rendered, and in
pursuance of the mother's wish, made known to
plaintiff, before his death, as shown by his own
tl'stimony, plaintiff conveyed to defendant the
five acres of land in question. Under these circumstances, we think the consideration was not
only meritorious, but valuable, and in every reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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spect adequate. 1 Jones, Law Real Prop. in Conv.
27 4; Brinton v. Van Cott, 8 Utah, 480, 33 Par.
218. In the case of McCall v. McCall, 135 U. S.
167, 10 Sup. Ct. 705, 34 L. Ed. 84. Mr. Justice
Brewer, speaking for the court, said: "Right or
·wrong, it would be expected that a parent will
favor a child who stands by him, and give to him,
rather than the others, his property. To defeat
a conveyance under these circumstances, something more than the natural influence springing
from such relations must be shown- imposition,
fraud, importunity, duress, or something of that
nature, must appear." Again: "It would be a
great reproach to the law, if, in its jealous watchfulness over the freedom of testamentary disposition, it should deprive age and infirmity of the
kindly ministrations of affection, or of the power
of rewarding those who bestow them.''
"It is contended by respondent that the only consideration for the conveyance that can be considered is that expressed in the instrument itself.
We do not understand this to be the law. The
rule is that in cases such as the one under consideration, where the rights of creditors are not
involved, the entire consideration may be shown.
Devlin on Deeds (1st Ed.) sec. 822 ; 1 Jones, Real
Prop. in Conv. : sec. 295 ; Rankin's Adm 'rs v. Wallace (Ky.) 14 S.W. 79; Barbee v. Barbee (N.C.)
13 S.E. 215. ''
In the recent case of Richmond Y. Ballard, 7 U. 2d
341, 325 P. 2d 839, this Court, in reversing the lower
court's finding of undue influence and deceased's advanced age and debilitated condition reiterated the criterion for setting aside a conveyance, as follows :
"Undue influence must be established by clear and
convincing evidence. In N orthcrest, Inc. v. Walker
30
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Bank and Trust Co. this court, at page 271 of the
Utah Report and at page 693 of the Pacific Reporter, said:
'Undisputed is the plaintiff's contention that
one who asserts the invalidity of a deed must
so prove by clear and convincing evidence.'
''Not only did the evidence fail to establish that
the signature to the deed was procured by undue
influence but the finding of undue influence is
against the clear weight of the evidence.''
The Court further quoted with approval from two
l\nrlier Utah cases, Anderson v. Thomas, 108 U. 252, 159
P. :!d 142; and In re Lavelle's Estate, 122 U. 253, 248 P.
2d 372.
In the Anderson Case the evidence relied on by the
plaintiff to set aside the conveyance included the following facts:
'' ( 1) The transfer to the defendant son was with-

out consideration (other than love and affection);
(2) The Grantor (mother) was 86 years old;

( 3) She was failing in health and almost totally

blind;
( 4) At time of the transfer she was grieving

over the loss of another son;
(5) Court found that, under the circumstances,
the Grantor could have been easily imposed
upon;
(6) The Grantee (son) lived in same home with
the Grantor;

31

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(7) The Grantee received "substantially all" of
Grantor's property a few months before
Grantors death;
(8) The transfer to Grantee in effect disinherited six other children;
"This Court, in an opinion by Justice Wolfe, affirmed the district court's decision refusing to find
undue influence on the above facts, stating:
'However, these circumstances alone are not
sufficient to show undue influence. The plaintiff must do more than merely raise a suspicion. There must be some affirmative evidence to show that Richard did exercise a
dominating influence over this mother and
thus induced her to part with her property.
Such affirmative evidence is almost totally
lacking here.'
"The court observed that 'no one testified to anything that would indicate that Richard was bringing pressure to bear on his mother to effect the
transfer of this property to him.' ''
In the case of In re Lavelle's Esta.te, supra, this
Court reversed a finding that a will had been induced by
undue influence. This Court, speaking through Jus tire
Crockett, held :
''To declare a will invalid because of undue
influence, there must be an exhibition of more
than influence or suggestion, there must be substantial proof of an overpowering of the testator's
volition at the time the will was made, to the extent he is impelled to do that ·which he would
not have done had he been free from such controlling influence, so that the will represents the
desire of the person exercising the influence rather than that of the testator."
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Courts in other jurisdictions have held similarly.
The California Supreme Court in the case of Burns v.
Campbell, 17 Cal. 2d 768, 112 P. 2d 237, reversed a derision of the lower court holding a deed to have been procured hy undue influence with these pertinent comments :
"Concerning undue influence, there is no evidence whatever that the appellant exercised any
control over ~Ir. Burns or that her actions were
the result of his direction. In addition to the
testimony concerning the conversation between
~~ n;;. Burns and appellant when she asked him to
return to the ranch, two other witnesses related
statements made by her at later times on this
suhjrrt. One of them said that in 1932 Mrs. Burns
told him she was going to deed the ranch to the a ppellant because he had done more for her than anyone else, with the exception of her sons. Another
related that she told him she had executed the
deed to him. The testimony of the attorney who
prepared the deed is clear and unequivocal that
~~ rs. Burns expressed the desire to convey her
ranch to the appellant and that she stated her
reason for so doing. There is no evidence that the
appellant ever requested her to execute a deed
to him or that he influenced her in that or any
other matter."
The court also commented that the "trial court made
findings in literal accordance with the allegations of the
eomplaint. ·' (Ibid. p. 239) This was also done by the
trial court in the instant case although a few changes
were made after Defendants objected and argued their
motion to amend the findings.
One of the findings made by the trial court in this
t'<lSt.' is that the Bradburys "did not have the benefit of
33
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independent advice in connection with said transactions.''
(R. 52) However, Mr. Olsen had never represented
either of the parties before; (R. 234) the Bradburys wPn•
there twice and discussed the matter with him after the
Rasmussens; (R. 240, 241) the Bradburys paid him for
his services; (Exh. 9, R. 477) and the trial court held
that their conversation with him, after this action was
commenced, was privileged and could not be disrloRPd.
(R. 125-127)
In Binder v. Binder, 50 W. 2d 142, 309 P. 2d 1050, the
Washington Supreme Court reversed a decision of the
lower court which annulled and cancelled a deed given
by the plaintiff (mother) to the defendant (her son). As
to the burden of proof the Court held :
''Mental competenry is presumed; and in order to establish mental incompetency, fraud, or
undue influence, the evidence must be clear, cogent, and convincing. Tecklenburg v. \Vashington
Gas & Electric Co., 40 Wash. 2d 141, 241 P. 2d
1172, 1174."
Again, on the matter of undue influence, the court held:
''In order to sustain the finding of undue influence in this case, where no mental incompetency
has been shown, the record must reveal that the
respondent was so completely under the influence
of appellant that she was incapable of acting on
her own motives:
" 'Influence becomes undue only when it
overcomes the will of the grantor ; when the
grantor acts under such coercion that his own
free agency is destroyed. The grantor's
views may be radically changed by the in34
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fluence exercised, but so long as he is not
overborne and rendered incapable of acting
upon his own motives, his acts are his own
nets, not those of another.' ParrY. Campbell,
109 'V ash. 376, 186 P. 858, quoted in Vossen
v. Wilson, 39 Wash. 2d 906, 239 P. 2d 558,
;)60. ''
\V ~' submit from the foregoing analysis of the facts
and the law that the evidence was insufficient to support
the determination of undue influence.

POINT III
THERE \VAS ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION
~,OR 'rHE TRANSFER OF THE PROPERTY
A~D THE EXECUTION OF THE LEASE.
'The plaintiffs argued, and the Court found in effect,
that the transfer of the property and water stock was a
gift and without consideration (Finding No. 13 (c) and
(d) R. :>2). However, the Court further found, as set
forth in tlw Statement of Facts, that Bradburys were intt>rested in haYing the Defendants move to Sevier County
and live close to them "where they could have the companionship and association with defendants and their
rhildren during their declining years''; and that ''Defendants gave up their home in Or em, Utah, and moved
to St'\·il'l' County and took over the operation of the
farm.·· In doing so the Defendants testified that they
both gaYe up good jobs in Orem. :Jir. Rasmussen was
making around $400.00 per month and :Jlrs. Rasmussen
was making about $225.00 per month. (R. 282)
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In the case of Randall v. Tracy CoZZ.ins Trust Company, 6 U. 2d 18, 305 P. 2d 480, the court was concerned

with a situation where the Plaintiff left his business and
home in Ogden and moved to Provo, Utah, which together with services rendered for the decedent was held
to be adequate consideration for an agreement to convey
real property.
In the case of Gibbons v. Brimm, 119 U. 621, 230 P.
2d 983, an action was brought to set aside a conveyance
of property to the Defendant which was made in return
for Defendant's promise to provide Plaintiff with a home,
support and care upon the ground that Plaintiff was so
infirm of body and mind "that her will was overcome to
the extent that the execution and delivery of the documents were not her voluntary acts.'' The Defendant
grantee in that case was a niece who had been the object
of special affection from the Plaintiff. The Grantor was
75 years of age, in ill health, and desired to have the Defendant come to live with her, care for her and run the
farm. Comments of the Court are particularly pertinent
to the facts in the instant matter, which we quote:
''The plaintiff apparently set out to make two
main contentions in seeking to avoid the effects of
the deed, bill of sale and assignment. (1) That
she was so infirm of body and mind that her will
was overcome to the extent that the execution and
delivery of the documents were not her voluntary
acts; and (2) that the defendants breached the
agreement to provide her a home and care, which
entitles her to rescission. The burden of proving
these contentions was upon the plaintiff.''
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Also:
"Without delineating them, we observe that the
PYidL•nre r<:'veals some discrepancies in plaintiff's
testimony concerning the ownership and disposition of personal property which may have given
rise to some skepticism on the part of the trial
court with respect to plaintiff's frankness, or perhaps better stated, her lack of memory and understanding of details due to her infirmity and advanced age.
''The plaintiff made some effort in the evidence
to ~upport her first point that the execution of the
conveyances were not voluntary. The sequence of
events themselves, without more, would be sufficient refutation of this contention. But taken together with other evidence there is ample to
warrant the court in refusing to believe that plaintiff had met her burden of proof that she did not
intend the conveyances.''
See also: Desert Centers, Inc. v. Glen Canyon, Inc.,

u r. 2d 166, 356 P. 2d 286.
There was obviously adequate consideration for the
transfer in the instant case and the court should have
~o found. "\Y e wish to call attention to the fact that the
trial court did find :
·'That at all times during the negotiations for the
~ale and purchase of the farm George R. Bradbury, deceased, and Althea Bradbury advised Defendants that the farm would be theirs upon the
death of the Bradburys, by virtue of contractual
obligations and subject thereto." (Finding No. 8
R. 51)

'
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The contractual obligations referred to by the court
could mean only the obligation to move to Joseph, Utah,
and take over the farm and live near the Bra.dburys,
where the latter could enjoy the companionship and association of Defendants and their children. Since Defendants complied in every respect they are entitled, as the
Defendant in the Brimm case, supra, to have the contract and agreement enforced.
POINT IV
DEFENDANTS WERE
JURY TRIAL.

ENTITLED TO A

Plaintiffs initially filed a demand for a jury trial.
(R. 16) Thereafter, at the pretrial conference PlaintiffH
attempted to withdraw their demand; but Defendants
refused to agree thereto and requested the court to try
the case to a jury. Rule 39(a) U.R.C.P. provides:
''When trial by jury has been demanded as
provided in Rule 38, the action shall be designated
upon the register of actions as a jury action. The
trial of all issues so demanded shall be by jury,
unless (1) the parties or their attorneys of record,
by written stipulation filed with the court or by
an oral stipulation made in open court and entered in the record, consent to trial by the court
sitting without a jury, or (2) the court upon motion or of its own initiative finds that a right by
trial by jury of some or all of those issues does not
exist, of (3) either party to the issue fails to appear at the trial.''
The court determined that the right of a trial by jury
did not exist, this being a case in equity, and therefore
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dispensed with a jury. Since no record of the pretrail
proceedings was made, the record on appeal does not disclose the ruling of the trial court. However, the record
does disclose that the case was not tried to a. jury and
that such jury trial was not waived by Defendants after
dE'mand had been made.
Sp<·tion 78-21-1, U.C.A.. 1953 gives to the parties a
right to trial by jury "in actions for the recovery of speeific real or personal property, with or without damages.''
In discussing when a trial by jury is required under our
~tatute this court, in the case of Norbeck v. Board of
Directors of Church Extension Society, 84 U. 506, 37 P.
2d 339 held:
''Almost without exception, the rule is that actions to try the title of real estate shall be tried
to a jury."
The court further stated:
''The mere fact that a suit is one to quiet title to
real property is not controlling. Generally a suit
to quiet title to real property is regarded as an
equitable proceeding; but because it is so regarded
does not determine the nature of the issue or deprive a party of his right to a trial by jury. If the
only question involved is that of title, the issue is
generally legal. A suit to establish an easement is
legal. :Jiason v. Ross, 77 N.J. Eq. 527, 77 A. 44. ''
This matter was recently considered by Justice Wade
in a separate opinion in the case of Johnson v. Johnson
9 rtah 2d 420, 337 P. 2d 20. That case involved an action'
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to rescind certain conveyances of real property, Justice
Wade made the following observation:
''I concur except I think this is an action to
recover real property and under Section 78-21-1
defendant was entitled to a jury trial. That section provides that '' (I)n actions for the recovery
of specific real or personal property, with or without damages * * * an issue of fact may be tried
by a jury, unless a jury is waived or a reference
is ordered." We have held a number of times that
this statute is controlling.
''Defendant did not claim the right to a jur~'
under this statute. He claims that this is a law
action because it is a will contest. He seems to
concede that the action to recover the real estate
is a suit in equity because it seeks to set aside a
contract of sale and a conveyance and a will on the
ground of fraud, undue influence and incompetency. It is hard to understand how a will contest is a law action but a suit to cancel a will
before the testator's death but after he has become
incompetent is a suit in equity. This illustrates
the maze of inconsistencies and borderline decisions required in applying the rule that the right
of a jury trial is determined by whether the question is raised in an action at law or a suit in equity
or whether the issues are legal or equitable."
SUMMARY
In conclusion Appellants respectfully urge that there
was no ''confidential relationship'' between Bradburys
and Defendants and therefore that the court below erroneously placed the burden on the Defendants "to prove
by clear and convincing evidence that the alleged gifts
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were t'uir, equitable, valid and free from any fraud or
undue influence arising from the faith and trust reposed
in them because of the confidential relationships.''
Because of its misconception as to the relationship
betwPt'll the parties, the lower court concluded that there
was undue influence exerted on the Bradburys by the
Defendants although the evidence is insufficient to show
hy clear and convincing proof any undue influence. On
t ht> contrary the transfers were made, and the lease executed, for good and sufficient consideration after the
Bradburys discussed the matter with legal counsel and
obtained his advice as to how the matter should be handled. And finally, the court improperly failed to allow
the matter to be tried by a jury after a jury trial had
been requested.
Respectfully submitted,
ARTHUR H. NIELSEN
NIELSEN, CoNDER

&

HANSEN

510 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellants
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